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ARCHEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE Frontier
Battle AT MUD SPRINGS, NEBRASKA
Peter Bleed and Douglas D. Scott
Department of Anthropology
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588-0368
pbleed1@unl.edu
ABSTRACT—Between February 4 and 7, 1865, Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho warriors engaged a force of
U.S. Army soldiers at Mud Springs, Nebraska. Historical records from both sides indicate that this fight marked
an early phase of the Indian Wars. Based on systematic metal detections, firearms identification, and terrain
analysis, this paper adds archeological insights into the arms and tactics used by the opposing sides. Well-armed
Native fighters used terrain to approach U.S. troops, who maintained a defensive posture. U.S. soldiers appear
to have dug a rifle pit to see approaching attackers.
Key Words: battlefield archeology, Civil War in the West, firearms identification, Indian Wars, viewshed analysis, weapons fan analysis

Introduction
Mud Springs is the modern name given to a perennial
wetland in the uplands south of the North Platte River
about 120 miles west of the fork of the South Platte. Native
folks certainly used this area, but its modern designation
was established by Oregon-California Trail emigrants
who used the area as a watering and resting point (Fig. 1).
In 1860 a Pony Express “home station” was built near
the Mud Springs water hole (Corbett 2006), and the
transcontinental telegraph line reached the station in July
1861. These occupations created archeological records
that warrant study, but this paper discusses the results of
archeological research into fighting that occurred at Mud
Springs on February 4-7, 1865, when it was the center of
an armed conflict between troops of the U.S. Army and a
body of Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho.
The Mud Springs fight offers an opportunity to demonstrate how the holistic approach of modern battlefield
archeology can augment historical sources to offer new
interpretations of specific conflicts. Mud Springs was not
as large as some other western battles, but it was longer
and sharper than others. Unlike many fights that occurred
in the open, the Mud Springs conflict involved defense of
a fixed facility. It occurred as the Civil War was ending
and before many tactical trends that marked the postwar period of Indian warfare had begun (Griffith 1989;
Jamieson 1994; Scott 2001). The U.S. Army had not yet

developed a clear strategy for combating Native populations, so reports of events at Mud Springs (Collins 1865)
contributed to development of the strategy that emerged
in the next decade of the 19th century. Occupation of the
West was still in an early phase. Military innovations of
the Civil War, notably repeating firearms, were less common in the West than they would be in a relatively brief
time. It also happens that Mud Springs has remarkably
complete written accounts from both the army and Indian
perspectives. These sources have been amply assembled
and presented (Henderson 1951; Hyde 1983; Robrock
1983; McDermott 1996, 2003; Halaas and Masich 2005).
Finally, the site is well preserved both as a Nebraska State
Historical landmark and is listed on the National Register
of Historic Places as 25MO72, representing the convergence of several significant historic events or themes.
This paper summarizes the results of investigations
carried out at Mud Springs. A full account of the results of
those investigations is available in an unpublished technical report (Bleed and Scott 2008).
The Fight at Mud Springs
The Mud Springs fight was one of number of clashes
that followed the November 29, 1864, destruction of Black
Kettle’s village of Cheyenne (McDermott 2003; Greene
and Scott 2004) by a regiment of Colorado Volunteers. In
the wake of that assault, a large community of Cheyenne,
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Figure 1. Aerial view of the Mud Springs Station site (25MO72).

Sioux, and Arapaho coalesced and moved toward the security of the isolated Sandhills and the Black Hills. With
relatively little opposition, this group attacked Julesburg,
Colorado, and ranches and other facilities to avenge the
massacre and to gather resources. The mobile community
numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. They reached the North
Platte in early February 1865 with a substantial store of
captured arms and resources. By no later than February
5, they established a camp at a place identified as “Rush
Creek.” This site has not been specifically located, but it
was probably in an area of natural springs near the head
of modern Cedar Creek eight miles east of Mud Springs.
Fighting at the Mud Springs Station may have started
as the Rush Creek camp was being established, and for
a couple of days it appears to have been the operational
base from which fighters attacked Mud Springs. The Rush
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Creek camp, having many families and their gear, was
a substantial base that was maintained until February
8, when the Native community continued its northward
journey. On the 8th and 9th, on the southern side of the
North Platte, warriors covering their community’s move
north met U.S. troops who had moved on from Mud
Springs. This engagement has come to be called the
Battle of Rush Creek.
As shown in an 1864 ground plan, the Mud Springs
Station consisted of two log buildings and a corral. One
building measured 35 × 16 feet and served as a squad
room and telegraph office. The other building was a stable
that measured 40 × 20 feet. These buildings were not
designed for defense; rather, they were built as a working
unit on the overland trail system. The structures sat on the
west side of dry wash that served as the path of the “Jules
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Cutoff,” a shortcut that provided Oregon Trail travelers
a way around the steep hill at Ash Hollow. The station
buildings were on a land surface some 10 feet above the
wash and separated by a low bank. A wetland, possibly
blocked to form a shallow pond, formed the northern
margin of the station. A lightly built corral was located
next to the stable, apparently to the west.
Sir Richard Burton, an English sportsman who on
August 12, 1860, passed through the Pony Express station
on his westward travels, described it:
The station-house was not unlike an Egyptian
Fellah’s hut. The material was sod, half peat
with vegetable matter; it is taken up in large
flakes after being furrowed with the plough,
and is cut to proper lengths with a shorthandled spade. Cedar timber, brought from the
neighbouring hills, formed the roof. The only
accommodation was an open shed, with a sort
of doorless dormitory by its side. We dined in
the shed, . . . Dreading the dormitory . . . of
fleas . . . I cast about for a quieter retreat. Fortune favoured me by pointing out the body of a
dismantled wagon. (Burton 1963: 87-88)
By 1865 the adobe structures appear to have been
dismantled and rebuilt with logs, as described by A. G.
Shaw, a battle participant with the 11th Ohio Volunteer
Cavalry:
There were several buildings, and rooms connected or a part of the same building. The Indians got behind the hill in the rear of the buildings
& would crawl to the top and shoot down into
the log buildings. There were no windows on
that side, but occasionally a bullet went through
the chinking and penetrated to the inside, but
nobody was hurt. (Jensen 2005:304)
The station complex is surrounded by a variety of
topographic features (Fig. 1). Immediately east of the
buildings there is a broad sandy draw. The level of the
station is separated from the draw by a bank that is steep
in some areas but less than 20 inches high. A series of hills
is located to the south of the building site. The closest of
these is less than 100 yards away and directly overlooks
the buildings. The buildings have not survived, but their
location is marked, based on oral traditions, by a stone
monument erected in 1939. The site has not been systematically tested, but in 1995 it was assessed with ground

15

penetration radar (Steinacher 1995). Specific anomalies
were not identified.
The Mud Springs fight is presented by both army and
Indian accounts, which have been assembled by John
McDermott (1996, 2003). The primary army accounts are
the after-action report of Col. William Collins of the 11th
Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (Collins 1865; Hewett 1997:20333). The Native perspective is represented in accounts
of the fight left by George Bent, the son of noted trader
William Bent and his Cheyenne wife, who rode with his
Indian kinsmen (Haack n.d.; Grinnell 1956; Hyde 1983;
Halaas and Masich 2005).
As recorded in these accounts, fighting at Mud
Springs began in the morning of February 4. At that time,
the site was occupied by a telegrapher, nine soldiers of
the 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and four local cowboys
who had a small herd of cattle as well as horses and mules
in the station corral. Indians attacked, driving off the
cattle and a number of horses. They did not immediately
cut the telegraph wire, however, so word of the attack
was quickly sent down the line. For the remainder of
the 4th, the defenders stayed in the station buildings and
traded shots with the attackers. Indians attacked both on
horseback and on foot. They appear to have been able to
approach the station building closely.
George Bent described the opening phase of the Mud
Springs fight in a May 4, 1906, letter to George Hyde.
This letter has been cited by several authors (Grinnell
1956; Hyde 1983:183-89; Halaas and Masich 2005), but
the original text transcribed by Stephen Haack presents
useful information:
That night scouts were sent ahead reported
ranch on Muddy Springs had soldiers, so
early next morning everybody got on their best
horses and started for the springs. The village
turned north east from here. We went due north
for the ranch. When we got near we could hear
lots of firing. Lot of Indians had started for
this place that night so as to run the stock, but
soldiers had all their animals inside the corral.
The soldiers were inside of buildings and had
port holes to shoot through. We could not tell
how many soldiers were in this party. Sand
creek ran close to the ranch with high bank.
The Indians got behind this bank and shot into
the buildings. At noon they turned all their animals loose. The mules and horses ran in every
direction. Indians were running after them.
Among rules with Indians, who touched the
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
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animal with anything in his hand, the animal
was his. I understood the soldiers were running
out of ammunition. They turned their stock
loose so the Indians would leave them and they
did so. After this the big village camped about
[he gives no number here] miles east of Muddy
Springs where we had fight. No Indians were
killed in this fight and as I say we could not
tell how many whites were killed in this fight.
Lots of shooting was done on both sides. All the
guns we ever captured were Spencer carbines.
They were the best guns at that time and were
handy to carry on horses. (Haack n.d.:33-34)

Bent’s recollections present a number of useful insights. First, he makes it clear that Indian fighters were
well armed and that from the outset there was considerable shooting. He clearly states that the station defenders
shot from loopholes made in the station wall. It is also
significant that although Bent does not mention attacks
from the hill south of the station, his account indicates
that the bank of the sandy draw on the east side of the
station let the attackers draw very close to the defenders’
base and that the attackers heavily used the bank.
Colonel Collins and his cavalry were about 90 miles
west of Mud Springs at Fort Laramie when word of the
attack was received (Collins 1865; Jones 2005). On the
evening of the February 4, he set out to relieve the station with some 120 men, including companies of the 11th
Ohio Volunteer Cavalry and some men of the 7th Iowa
Volunteer Cavalry. He also ordered a relief party of Lt.
William Ellsworth and 36 men of Company H, 11th Ohio
Volunteer Cavalry, stationed at Fort Mitchell, to Mud
Springs. Ellsworth arrived early on February 5. Collins
arrived early on the 6th, having ridden for two nights. An
overnight ride in midwinter must have been a demanding
effort, but the weather appears to have been quite mild.
Temperature records at Fort Laramie record the afternoon
high on February 5 at 48 degrees (Fahrenheit) (J. Preston,
personal communication, Wyoming Water Resources,
March 23, 2006). In a letter written in 1906, George Bent
recollected, “There was no snow on the ground although
it was February. Winter of 1865 was open winter” (Haack
n.d.:34).
The newly arrived army troops established a corral of
wagons and other materials adjacent to the station. They
kept their stock in this confine and used it as a defensive
line for most of February 5. Army troopers were armed
with Spencer rifles or carbines. Indians were described as
using repeating rifles, revolvers, and bows and arrows. In
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

his report presented in the Official Report of the War of
the Rebellion, Collins (1865) described the fighting on the
6th as a game of “bo-peep” in which both the army and Indian fighters searched out sheltered spots from which they
could stand and surprise their adversaries. The warriors
were attracted to horses in the expanded corral. They also
harassed the station on horseback and on foot, using the
terrain as effective cover to draw close to the station. The
fighting spread over a wide area, with mounted Indians
alternately charging the station and taking shelter from
soldiers’ rifle fire by galloping behind far hills.
On February 6, the fighting became quite intense. Collins estimated that between 500 and 1,000 Indian fighters were involved in the attack. Based on estimates by
other observers, McDermott (2003:38) believes the higher
number is the most accurate. In addition to continuing to
try to drive off horses and mules penned in the corral,
Indians also brought groups of up to 200 individuals to
the top of the hill immediately south of the station. This
brought them within 75 yards of the station buildings and
allowed them to send in volleys of bullets and arrows.
To deal with those attacks, on the afternoon of the 6th
Collins organized an assault by mounted and unmounted
troopers on the hill south of the station. After that assault, Indians abandoned the high ground, and troopers
occupied it. They even dug a “rifle pit” on the hilltop
(McDermott 2003:39).
With a secure perimeter and another detachment of
50 men of the 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, who arrived
from Fort Laramie with a cannon late on the 6th, the army
was able to leave the station confines. On the 7th, Collins
sent out scouting parties to locate the main Indian camp.
Following well-worn trails, the scouts easily located it.
On the morning of the 8th, Collins led a force of some 185
troopers out of Mud Springs to pursue the Cheyenne and
their allies, who were by that time breaking their Rush
Creek camp and heading across the North Platte. At that
point, the battle of Mud Springs was over.
In sum, the Mud Springs battle involved more than
200 U.S. troops and upwards of 1,000 Indian fighters.
The two sides fought for more than three days, using a
variety of firearms and traditional weapons. Casualties
are uncertain but seem light. No army soldiers were killed
outright in the fighting, and no Indian bodies were observed, although army participants suggested that some
30 of their adversaries had been dispatched. George Bent
says no Indians were killed in the fighting at Mud Springs
(Hyde 1983:193). The fight did not mark a decisive point
in frontier military history, but the formal report Collins prepared on the fight appears to have been read and
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considered by military leaders (McDermott 2003:35-45).
Combat of this period also contributed to formation of
post-Civil War military policies in the American West
(Hatch 2003).
Questions about the Mud Springs Fight
Since few historic battles have been investigated in
the Central Plains, the site presents an opportunity to
identify the archeological characteristics of set, multiday
battles in this environment. There were also specific
uncertainties about the Mud Springs fight that were clarified with archeological materials. The most obvious of
these is the armaments used by the Indian fighters. Army
soldiers carried Spencer repeating carbines or rifles and
other regulation weapons. It was not known what kinds
of arms Indian fighters carried, but they were identified
by recovered bullets and cartridge cases.
The limits of the battlefield and the extent of the contested zone were not known. The tactics of the fight were
also unclear. Descriptions of “bo-peep” exchanges and
firing volleys at charging mounted warriors seem graphic, but it is not clear what they actually involved. Where
did attackers and defenders position themselves? How
was local terrain used to support these tactics? How was
volley fire aimed? The role of the rifle pit also required
investigation. The size and shape of the pit needed to be
clarified to determine how it conformed to standard Civil
War-era entrenchment practice. Excavation determined
that the pit is truly an artificial feature and is associated
with the fight. By assessing the location of the pit relative
to other terrain features of the battle, one can suggest the
strategic intentions behind its construction and its role in
the fight.
Field and Analytical Methods
Since a primary research goal of the Mud Springs
inventory was to locate and define the limits of the battlefield, it was necessary to determine where artifacts were
found, but also where artifacts were not found. The first
requirement, then, was to develop field procedures that
were capable of examining the entire extent of the battlefield. The area to be inventoried was relatively small,
totaling some 40 acres. It was assumed that most surviving artifacts of war are either metallic or associated with
metal, and metal detectors were employed as an inventory
tool because of the success of the technique at Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument (Scott and Fox 1987;
Scott et al. 1989) and its wide use since then.
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Locational control was accomplished through the
use of a Global Positioning System handheld unit and
electronic data collector. As artifacts were found, each
item or location was recorded on the data recorder. Each
was identified by unique UTM coordinates and a previously established identification code. The recovery crew
followed and carefully uncovered subsurface finds and
identified the finds. Inventory operations were designed
primarily to locate subsurface metallic items with the
use of electronic metal detectors. The operators walked
transects by topographic feature orientation. The area
examined included the immediate area around the Mud
Springs Station buildings, the purported corral area to
the west, and up to the banks of the present pond on the
north. The areas between the station site and the hill to the
south and the steep creek bank were examined in detail,
as was the rolling hills to the west for one-quarter mile.
The first and second terraces of the creek on the east were
also metal-detected, but no historic finds were made. The
creek is an active fluvial channel, and only modern items
were found on the sweeps below the stream bank. Either
the area has been flushed by flooding events or the older
surfaces are buried beyond modern metal-detector depth
range.
The archeological integrity of the Mud Springs battle
appears good. There are reports that cartridges have been
collected around the station site. The area has also been visited by collectors with metal detectors. Previous searches
of the site seems not to have been systematic or intensive,
though, and there are no signs of serious earth moving.
Archeological Assemblage
Cartridges, cartridge cases, and bullets form the
majority of the artifacts recovered at Mud Springs. A
full discussion of these materials is presented in Bleed
and Scott (2008). The Nebraska State Historical Society
also has a small collection of items collected from or
near the presumed site of the buildings at Mud Springs
Station. Since precise recovery points were not known,
these items were not analyzed as part of this project.
Systematically recovered materials were analyzed using
standard firearms identification procedures (Gunther and
Gunther 1935; Hatcher 1943; Hatcher et al. 1977; Harris
1980; Heard 1997; Haag 2006) in order to determine the
kind of arm, and where possible, the specific weapon that
fired the materials. This then allowed determination of
the number of different types of guns in use at the battle.
Further, comparing the unique qualities of individual firearm types allows us to identify individual weapons. This
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
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capability is very important because we can use identical individual characteristics, coupled with the precise
artifact locations, to trace the movements of individual
weapons across the field of battle. With this information,
patterns of movement can be established and the battle
sequence can be more precisely interpreted.
In total, 44 cartridges, cases, and bullets in the systematically recovered assemblage could be dated to the
period of the battle. These were fired from the following
weapons: .36-caliber Starr revolver, .44-caliber Henry
rifle, .44-caliber Ballard carbine, .54-caliber Leman rifle,
.56-56-caliber Spencer and Joslyn carbines, and .58-caliber rifled musket, which might be either a rebored M1841
rifle, or a M1855, a M1861, a M1863, or an Enfield P53
rifled musket. Additionally, a single “top hat” or “musket
cap” was found during the test excavation of the rifle pit.
The cap is unfired, as it bears no tool marks from being
struck by a hammer (Weber and Scott 2006:131-43).
Beyond identifying the kinds of guns used at Mud
Springs, firearm identification of the archeologically
recovered materials indicates that there were at least 21
different firearms used during the 1865 Mud Springs
battle. This number includes at least one .36-caliber Starr
revolver, one .44-caliber Colt M1860 army revolver, two
.44-caliber Henry rifles, five .44-caliber Ballard carbines,
one .54-caliber Leman rifle, two .56-56-caliber Joslyn
carbines, eight 56-56 Spencer carbines, and one .58-caliber rifled musket.
Firearms Artifact Distribution
Total artifact recovery was limited given the sampling
technique employed. It was also no surprise that only a
small number of artifacts were recovered given the landowner’s statements that he has allowed relic hunters on
the site on a routine basis, as long as they asked permission. He recalled that previous collectors found handfuls
of Spencer and other cartridge cases.
Nevertheless, the archeologically recovered cartridge
cases and bullets do not appear to be randomly distributed. Rather, the find pattern distribution is consistent
with the historic battle accounts. The Spencer and Joslyn
cartridge cases representing eight and two separate guns,
respectively, were found scattered around the traditional
location of the buildings at Mud Springs Station. Cartridge cases fired from those same guns were found on
the north side of the hill and on top of the hill south of the
station as well as in a low area between the south hill and
a rise to the west. This distribution is consistent with the
army accounts of the battle, which have the soldiers forti© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

fying the station even after arrival of the relief columns.
The Spencer and Joslyn cartridge cases found around the
south hill and to the west are also consistent with Colonel
Collins’s report of making a mounted sortie to the south
and driving the attacking warriors from the hill and the
general area.
The .44-caliber Ballard cartridge cases, representing
five guns, and the .44-caliber Henry cartridge cases, representing two guns, were recovered either on the rise or
ridge to the southwest of the station buildings or behind
a low rise on the lower west flank of the south hill. This
distribution, along with that of the bullets, is consistent
with positions the warriors utilized.
The 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry is known to have
been armed in 1864 with Spencer, Smith, and Merrill carbines as well as M1847 Musketoons (McAulay 1996:54).
In 1865 only Spencers are reported (McAulay 1996:64).
The 7th Iowa Volunteer Cavalry is reported to be armed
with the Gallager carbine in 1864 (McAulay 1996:52),
but there is no information reported for 1865. The Smith,
Merrill, and Gallager carbines were all percussion ignition
types and not cartridge firearms (McAulay 1981:32-35,
40-44, 62-68). Neither unit was reported to have been
armed with the Joslyn carbine. However, ordnance returns
for Union Civil War units are notoriously incomplete, and
uncritical reliance on them is inappropriate. Certainly
given the archeological context, it appears the units were
likely armed with Spencer and Joslyn carbines both firing
the same type of metallic cartridge ammunition.
The Ballard rimfire carbine and the Henry rifle were
likely in warrior hands. Neither weapon type was new or
unknown in the western regions. Both also employed the
same caliber metallic cartridge, the .44-caliber rimfire.
The only other recovered artifact that is likely to be
part of the battle debris is the strap bar segment of a brass
1859-pattern cavalry spur found near the station site.
“Rifle Pit” Feature Excavation and
Interpretation
Given the mention that Collins’s troops dug a rifle pit
after they arrived at Mud Springs, a depression observed
on the top of the hill south of the Mud Springs Station
(Fig. 2) deserved specific investigation and documentation. Expedient defenses have a long military history.
They were used in Civil War engagements but are presumed to be less common in western fights. Surviving
examples of Civil War-era rifle pits are quite rare.
There are a number of “blowouts” that interrupt the
sod on the hilltop. These may be why Henderson (1951)
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Figure 2. View south across the Mud Springs Station site to the hill occupied by warriors and the army during the battle.

mentions multiple “pits,” but only one of the interruptions appears to be evidence of a consciously excavated
feature. Some oral history associated with this feature
appears to conflict with the assumption that it is the pit
Collins reported to have excavated during the fighting at
Mud Springs. Scott Cape, the current landowner, related
that his father had been told that this feature was a pioneer woman’s burial site until her remains were moved to
another location.
The observed depression was roughly circular, approximately 2 m in diameter and about 20 cm lower than
the surrounding ground level. The test unit opened to
assess the depression was laid out across what appeared
to be the western margin of the original pit. The profile
of the south wall of the test unit, however, did not reveal
a clear, excavated edge. Below the thin layer of matted
vegetation, the pit fill consisted of mixed gray sand that
contained charcoal flecks and artifacts, including the
mid-portion of a bifacially flaked projectile point, four
flake fragments, and an unused percussion cap. There
was no apparent edge to this level that might reflect the
excavated edge of a rifle pit, but it was thickest toward
the center of the depression. Below the gray sand layer,
the soil consisted of more solidly compacted sandy loam.

The divide between this layer and the mixed sand was
distinct enough to potentially reflect an artificial surface.
No artifacts were found below this level. The top of the
undisturbed sandy loam seems to form a gentle depression that at its deepest point is some 60 cm below the
current soil surface.
Test excavation of the potential rifle pit indicates that
it is a shallow artificial feature that was excavated to have
sloping sides. Little more can be said about its original
size and shape, but it seems very uncertain that it could
have served as even a temporary burial site. The combination of stone artifacts and a percussion cap strongly
suggests that the area of the pit had a complex history.
Given the historical mention of a rifle pit, and pending
further investigation, we believe that the hilltop feature
can be interpreted as a simple excavation linked to the
Mud Springs fight.
Martial Contexts of Mud Springs:
Army and Indian Tactics in the
Mid-19th Century
The Napoleonic Wars and the U.S.-Mexican War
(1846-48) heavily influenced army tactical doctrine during
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
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the early years of the Civil War. Officers learned this
approach to warfare during their education at the West
Point military academy and in the field during the Civil
War. The basic tactic taught at West Point prior to the
Civil War was close-order infantry assaults with bayonets gleaming, cavalry charges with sabers flashing, and
direct fire by smoothbore artillery placed toward the front
of the line. These tactics, through hard-learned lessons of
the Civil War, gave way by 1863 to a different approach
(Griffith 1986, 1989). By the last years of the war, tactics
had adapted to the effectiveness of modern rifled arms.
Infantry tactics were modified to open-order skirmish
lines using available cover whenever possible. Defensive
positions were usually fortified with extensive entrenchments. Prepared rifle pits, picket posts, and videttes usually protected even short-term camps.
Of the three combat branches, cavalry made the
greatest adaptation during the latter part of the Civil
War, continuing these tactics during the Indian Wars
(Russell 1987; Jamieson 1994). In battle it moved from
the close-order charge meant to break or outflank a line
to a mobile unit that could move quickly to the scene of
action, then dismount and fight as light infantry. With
the advent of breech-loading single-shot and repeating
carbines, cavalry firepower increased dramatically. This
increased firepower and mobility allowed the cavalry to
regain the usefulness on the battlefield it had lost with the
introduction of the rifled musket. Cavalry was also used
extensively throughout the Civil War and Indian Wars as
a fast and efficient scouting and intelligence-gathering
arm. Mobility was its key asset; cavalry units could range
far and wide around larger, marching columns to protect
them and to scout the opponent’s movements.
In general, the nature of conflict between soldiers and
Indians was unique and afforded some major differences
in the way each group of combatants conducted warfare.
Within the Indians’ cultural context, fighting was usually
accomplished as individuals or in loosely affiliated war
groups. Fighting usually employed surprise, ambush,
and decoy (Grinnell 1910, 1956; Smith 1937; Secoy 1992;
DeMallie and Parks 2003:66-76). Tactically, warriors
employed the terrain to their benefit, striking quickly in
small groups as opportunities presented themselves. The
U.S. Army was constantly frustrated by the Indian hitand-run tactic (White 1978). Also, frontier army officers
and men had little understanding of the Plains Indian’s
war-honor concept of counting coup, which was so ingrained within their cultural construct to achieve hero
status within the group (McGinnis 1990). Aside from
touching an opponent, one could gain other levels of dis© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
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tinction by capturing a weapon from a live enemy, stealing a horse, or rescuing a fallen warrior from the enemy.
Regardless, destruction of an enemy or protection of the
family or band were paramount in combat, and inflicting
casualties on the enemy by killing or wounding was a
natural outcome of such tactics.
The tactics employed by both sides during the Mud
Springs fight are evident in the patterned distribution
of the archeological record. When that record is supplemented by the application of firearm identification procedures, the actual movement of both soldiers and warriors
is clearly seen. Individual warriors availed themselves
of the protective cover provided by the terrain within
gunshot range of the Mud Springs Station buildings. The
soldiers, employing those buildings as a fixed defense,
utilized tactics current with late-Civil War fighting
proscriptions. When Collins arrived, he took an aggressive posture and literally charged the warriors’ positions
with his men, forcing the tribesmen to vacate the area.
Those events deposited physical evidence on the ground
in patterns that remained to be recovered during the archeological investigations. That evidence was recovered,
and the patterns of deposition reflect the fighting methods
employed by both sides. Yet there were still questions to
be answered that were not fully reflected in the recovered
data set.
Looking at the Mud Springs Landscape:
Terrain Analysis
The Mud Springs rifle pit presented a special challenge. Use of hasty entrenchments was certainly an
established tactic by the mid-19th century, but it is not
clear why the leader of a cavalry detachment decided to
“dig in” shortly after breaking the siege at Mud Springs.
Likewise, it is not clear why the pit was dug where it was.
Those questions offered an opportunity to reassess the
documentary and oral history resources from yet another
angle. The approach chosen was viewshed analysis, which
employs the power of Geographic Information System
(GIS) computer-based programs. Viewshed analysis is
a GIS technique that makes it possible to identify views
and vistas available from a given point. It has become a
refined archeological tool (Wheatley and Gillings 2002)
that can expose settlement choices (Jones 2006) and visual landscapes (Llobera 2007). In military parlance this
is known as terrain analysis or weapons fan analysis.
Viewshed analysis is a fairly straightforward technique that, when calculated on the computer, is facilitated
by files known as digital elevation models (DEMs). A
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Figure 3. Comparison of the weapons fans available from the rifle pit (A) and from the station buildings (B). These fans suggest
that shooting from the hill above the station had a slight advantage.

standard DEM is essentially the same as a digital image,
a matrix of cells containing a given color value, with the
important exception that in a DEM, instead of storing
color information, the cells of a DEM store elevation data.
This grid of cells is known as a raster dataset. For this
analysis, each cell or pixel within the DEM represents the
elevation of a square plot of land, in this case 10 m on a
side. The elevation data may then be used by the computer
to calculate viewsheds from any point or set of points on
the landscape.
When calculating a viewshed from a given point, the
computer simply tests each cell in the raster to see if a
straight line can be interpolated from the cell to the designated point without being obscured by another cell. If a
cell representing a higher elevation value lies between the
point and the cell being tested, then that cell being tested
is considered invisible from the selected point. However,
if no such intervening value is present, then the cell being
tested is within the viewshed of the selected point. Each of
the viewsheds calculated for this exercise used the available DEMs. These data do not project undergrowth, trees,
or other vegetation that may have been present, which are
minimal at the Mud Springs site. The calculations simply
show what can be seen from a certain spot at a certain
point above the ground for a certain distance without taking into account vegetation patterns. These patterns can
then be correlated with the archeological and historical
record as an additional validation tool.
Weapons fan analysis is a military amplification of
viewshed methodology. If a viewshed defines those areas

of a landscape visible from a given point, weapons fan
analysis combines the viewshed approach with technical
information about the weaponry in actual use to determine
potential targets to be had from a military emplacement.
Weapons fan analysis builds easily on firearms analysis
since it makes use of the same kinds of ballistic information. The Mud Springs rifle pit’s calculated viewshed was
based on the functional range of the firearms available at
the time.
Figure 3 presents the weapons fans that would have
been available to soldiers or stockmen in the Mud Springs
Station or for a picket stationed at the rifle pit on the hill to
the south. It assumes a 700 m rifle range, the approximate
limit of effective use for a Spencer carbine. It also assumes that crouching shooters fired from window height,
or 1 m. The calculated weapons fans show clearly that
gunmen could see and cover most of the area around the
station. There were two exceptions. The hill to the south
of the station hid much of that area so that attackers could
approach unseen to within 100 m of the station. The far
horizons were both out of rifle range and not visible from
the station. The archeological evidence shows that warriors used that landscape to fire on the occupants of the
Mud Springs Station complex.
Two long-distance viewsheds (Fig. 4) document that
most of the areas visible from the station, together with
distant vistas, were also visible for a 1.5-m-tall individual
standing at the tested rifle pit. The hilltop did not reveal
much that could not be seen from the station, but distant
plains to the south and west were visible from the hilltop.
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
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Figure 4. Comparison of the 2,500 m viewsheds from the rifle pit (A) and the station site (B). Clearly, a fuller view was available
from the rifle pit.

An individual stationed in the rifle pit could easily see the
areas to the north, south, and east, and warn of anyone approaching from those directions. The location especially
afforded a good view of the territory to the east, which
riders traveling back and forth between Mud Springs and
the Rush Creek camp had to cross. Areas to the north,
south, east, and immediately west of the station were visible enough to allow defenders to see anyone approaching
from those directions.
Clearly, the pit would have been a good lookout post.
But since soldiers could see farther than they could shoot,
the weapons fan from the pit is very different from its
distant viewshed. The hilltop weapons fan did reach a
few areas that could not be hit from the station, but it was
far less than perfect. It was certainly fragmented, so that
warriors could approach from the west unseen to within
20 m of the pit. Beyond that, the hill to the southwest
of the station covered an area big enough to serve as a
staging area for mounted raids. The pit was thus not well
placed for combative defense of the soldiers’ position. If
the rifle pit was occupied by soldiers after breaking the
station siege, other pickets or guards must have covered
the western approaches. If the pit was occupied in order to
provide a view of attackers coming from the south, it was
an effective location that allowed for ample time to warn
those camped around or in the station. On the other hand,
if the pit was constructed by the besieging warriors, then
they had an excellent tactical position to pour fire into the
station and corral while maintaining excellent protection
for the pit occupants. Given that their warrior kinsmen
© 2009 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

were on their western flank, a view of that area may not
have been necessary.
Conclusions
Archeological investigations of the Mud Springs
battlefield present clear evidence that even the relatively
small conflicts of the Great Plains frontier left physical
evidence that can be archeologically recovered and interpreted to augment other records. Mud Springs also shows
that even though western combat may have involved
hundred of fighters and days of conflict, it is likely to be
evidenced only by broad artifact distributions that require
close analysis.
The artifact distribution across the landscape indicates that during the fight, warriors used the available
terrain to their advantage. They fired at the station from
behind the crest of the south hill, from behind a small rise
on its lower flanks, and from behind a rise to the west. All
locations were well within the range of the warriors’ firearms and the range of return fire from soldiers and civilians in the station. The archeological assemblage suggests
that the two sides that met at Mud Springs were in one
way surprisingly well matched. Indian fighters appear to
have had a wider array of arms than U.S. troops, but the
armaments of the two sides seem fully comparable. The
fighting left material signatures that suggest, however,
that the two sides were tactically mismatched.
Recovered ammunition is consistent with intense fire
from near the station. Volley fire at mounted fighters and
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shots by mounted raiders, which are described in historical accounts of the fight, are not readily apparent even
though hills and surfaces well removed from the station
were surveyed. Archeologically, the margins of the Mud
Springs battle were very hard to recognize. In part this
may be due to indiscriminant relic collecting over the
years, and to flooding and other fluvial events in the area
where the creek has changed the landform. However, the
rifle pit excavated to the south of the station can best be
interpreted as a defensive lookout post. It suggests that
most of the time, U.S. troops maintained an entirely defensive posture. A strong perimeter appears to have been
augmented by a sentinel who could both see approaching
enemy and possibly discourage furtive attacks. There
is no evidence that troops were massed or arrayed in
strength anywhere but at the station itself.
Indian warriors employed a very different approach to
the Mud Springs fight. Artifact distribution together with
viewshed and weapons fan analyses suggest that the terrain around Mud Springs supported hit-and-run tactics,
stealthy attack, and mounted forays. At least some Indian
shots were taken from open areas west of the station, and,
according to historical accounts, the warriors appear to
have used the available terrain, including the creek bank,
to their advantage during the fight. The warriors fired at
the station from behind the crest of the south hill, from
behind a small rise on its lower flanks, from protection
of the creek bank to the east, and from behind a rise to
the west. The general situation appears to be a classic
example of Native American fighting traditions of hitand-run tactics, employing maximum cover to minimize
exposure, and using superior numbers to pin down opponents in order to take the stock, supplies, or other war
booty (Secoy 1992).
The U.S. Army was constantly frustrated by Indian
hit-and-run tactics throughout most of the mid- to late
19th century. Organized effort, dependence on technological advantage, and defense of fixed facilities judged
important marked U.S. military thinking of the day and
is reflected in the archeological record of the defense of
Mud Springs Station. Such tactical thinking was just
beginning to undergo a marked change and to be carried
to fruition over the next few years as warfare with the
various Plains tribes reached its zenith. The warriors’
use of the terrain to maneuver and to provide cover and
maximum protection to the combatants is also amply
reflected in the archeological record. A combination
of analytical techniques, evaluation of historical and
oral history sources, interpretation of the archeological
record, and GIS-based terrain analysis provides a more
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complete view of the events at Mud Springs in February
1865. Aside from precisely locating battle events in space,
the Mud Springs artifact distribution provides clear evidence of the different fighting styles of the two combatant
groups, demonstrating the U.S. Army’s versus the Plains
Indians’ manner of fighting and defense. Viewed in light
of the expanding array of analytical techniques of modern
battlefield research, Mud Springs offers an archeological
reflection of those cultural differences in the practice of
war and warfare.
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